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I. INTRODUCTION

During the Presidential campaign of 1992, President Clinton proposed two
significant changes which would drastically effect how cities and
municipalities run their government. First, then Candidate Clinton proposed
to improve the infrastructure of cities. 2 These improvements were seen as being
necessary to create jobs. 3 Second, he also pledged to be the 'environmental
President.' 4 As part of his environmental pledge, President Clinton vowed to
enforce environmental laws to the fullest extent possible.5 While for most, these
two pledges could co-exist without any sort of conflict, such is not necessarily
the case with municipalities who violate the Clean Water Act.6
In attempting to understand exactly how the Clean Water Act applies to
municipalities, the best starting point is to examine the language of the statute
itself.7 The Act makes it unlawful for anyone, including municipalities, 8 to
discharge a pollutant 9 into navigable waters 10 except as authorized by specific

2

Ann Scales, Hopefuls hitting the roads: Crumbling cities, streets become issue, THE
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 1992, at 1A.
3

1d.
Clinton Faces Tough Job Funding, U.S. Environment Reforms, Reuters, Oct. 30, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires file; Gore Says Bush Offers More of the Same:
Protectionsfor Big Polluters, U.S. Newswire, Oct. 29, 1992, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires file.
4

5

See supra note 4.
633 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1387 (1988).
7
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49,57 (1987);
Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102,108 (1980); Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 198-99 (1976); United States v. City of New York, 481
F. Supp. 4,6 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
8
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(4)(1988), the term "municipality" is defined as:
a city, town, borough, county, parish, district, association, or other
public body created by or pursuant to State law and having jurisdiction over disposal of sewage, industrial wastes, or other wastes,
or an Indian tribe or an authorized Indian tribal organization, or a
designated and approved management agency under section 1288
of this title..
9
Under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(1988), the term "discharge of a pollutants" is defined
as: "A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, B)any
addition of amy pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any
point source other than a vessel or other floating craft."
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sections of the Act.11 To implement this prohibition, as well as the exceptions,
the Clean Water Act established a complex system regulating all discharges
into the navigable waters of the United States. 12 The principal method of
regulating such discharges in these cases is the National Pollutant Discharge
13
Elimination System (NPDES).
14
While the complexities of the NPDES system will be explained later,
basically, the EPA Administrator, or if delegated to a State, 15 the head of the
state water pollution control agency,16 issues an NPDES permit to an individual
discharger. The permit sets specific effluent limits for that discharger. All permit
holders are required to self-monitor their compliance with the permit by
maintaining and transmitting to the Administrator or delegated state agency
discharge monitoring reports (DMRs). 17 These DMRs are available to the
public. 18 Moreover, these DMRs are required to be submitted monthly or
weekly depending upon the terms and conditions of the permit. 19
Under the Act, the discharge of pollutants without a permit or in violation
of a permit condition may result in civil penalties of up to $25,000 per day per
21
violation 20 and/or a criminal penalty of up to $50,000 per day per violation.
While these penalties could be extremely costly for municipalities, the problem
becomes even more severe because many times correcting the problem could
cost millions and sometimes billions of dollars for municipalities. If the
municipalities do not have the money to correct the problems, the
10

Under 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7)(1988), the term "navigable waters" is defined as the

waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.
llGwaltney of Smitl!feld, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 52; New York Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n v.
New York Dep't. of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); United States v.
City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1989); United States v. Metropolitan
Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1352 (D. Mass. 1985).
12 Metropolitan Dist. Cornm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1352; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1342

(1988).
1333 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988).
14

See infra notes 105-23 and accompanying text.

15

For an understanding of how a State becomes a delegated issuer of NPDESpermits,
see infra notes 108-21 and accompanying text.
16

The term "state water pollution control agency" is defined under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(2)(1988) as "the State agency designated by the Governor having responsibility
for enforcing State laws relating to the abatement of pollution."
17 United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1352
(D. Mass. 1985)(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1318(b)).
18

Id.

19 See 40 C.F.R. § 403.12 (1992); Munford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp.
392 (D. Conn. 1986).
2033 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988).
21

id. § 1319(c).
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municipalities continue to violate the Clean Water Act, thereby subjecting
themselves to astronomical fines.
The purpose of this article is to outline the difficulties that municipalities
face in meeting the legal discharge requirements, and to establish why
subjecting municipalities to civil penalties which are ultimately deposited to
the U.S. Treasury is an ineffective way of correcting municipal problems.
Finally, this article seeks to provide an alternative solution that will not only
ensure that municipal violations of the Clean Water Act will be corrected, but
that such municipal violations will be corrected in a more efficient manner than
the methods that are currently being used today.
II. THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BEHIND MUNICIPAL
LIABILITY UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT

In 1972, Congress passed amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control' Act (FWPCA).22 The purpose of the FWPCA amendments was to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
nation's waters. 23 It is through this comprehensive legislation that Congress
has asserted federal power over water pollution matters which relate to
municipalities.24 The FWPCA amendments of 1972 totally revised all previous
water pollution control legislation, 25 including the FWPCA of 1965 which
concentrated on water quality standards. 2 6 Moreover, the earlier act
established standards for the acceptable levels of pollution in a state's
navigable waters.2 7 The problem with the 1965 Act, however, stemmed from
the character of the standards themselves which focused on the tolerable
effects, rather than the preventable causes, of water pollution. The problems
also resulted from the awkwardly shared federal and state responsibility in
implementing such standards, and from the cumbrous enforcement
procedures 28 and standards which governed the conduct of individual
§§ 1251-1387 (1988).
2333 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1988).
2233 U.S.C.
24 United
25

States v. Duracell Int'l, 510 F.Supp. 154, 155 (M.D. Tenn. 1981).

1d. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3776, 3777.
26
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. State of Wis. Natural Resources Bd., 280 N.W.2d 218
(Wis. 1979). In Wisconsin ElectricPower Co., the Wisconsin Supreme Court defined the
difference between water quality standards and effluent standards in that "water quality
standards refer to maximum concentrations of pollutants in a body of water while
effluent standards refer to absolute limitation on pollutants discharged from a particular
source. The former are concerned with the quality of a water body in general while the

latter emphasize the quality of a discharge source entering a water body." Id. at 224; see
also, Montgomery Envtl. Coalition v. Fri, 366 F. Supp. 261 (D.D.C. 1973).
27
United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D.R.I. 1980).
28Environmental

Protection Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.

200, 202 (1976).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/4
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polluters. 29 The earlier legislation was, in essence, ineffectual in protecting the
30
public from water pollution.
The 1972 Amendments accomplished two significant changes in the
First, they provided the maximum effluent limitations on
regulatory scheme.
"point sources," 3 1 and established water quality standards. The direct
restriction on discharges made enforcement easier because it was no longer
necessary to work backward from an overpolluted body of water to determine
32
which point sources were responsible and which should have been abated.
In addition, the Amendments measured the discharger's performance against
strict technology based effluent limitations to which the discharger would have
to conform rather than against limitations derived from water quality
standards to which the discharger and other polluters would have to
33
collectively confer.
Second, the Amendments established the NPDES system.3 4 Under the
NPDES system, permits are to be obtained in the first instance from the EPA.
The permits issued by EPA are required to conform with Section 402 of the
Act.35 However, in recognition of the interest of the States and in order to
encourage their continued interest in reducing and ultimately eliminating
pollution, Congress provided that a State program approved by EPA could
issue permits.3 6 Specifically, this delegation was passed "to recognize, preserve
and protect the primary responsibilities and the rights of states to prevent,
37
reduce and eliminate pollution.1
The 1972 Amendments were also significant in that all Publicly Owned
Treatment Works (POTWs) that discharged over five million gallons of effluent
per day were required to meet secondary treatment standards 38 no later than

29

1d. at 202-03.

30

United States v. Duracell Int'l, 510 F. Supp. at 155; See also Sen. Rep. No. 92-414,
92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3688, 3672.
31
"Point Sources" are defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)(Supp. 1993), as:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not
limited to amy pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel
or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged.
This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return
flows from irrigated agriculture.
32
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 204.
33

1d.

34
35
36

Id.; United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 606 (D.R.I. 1980).
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 206.
Id. at 202-09.

37

1d. at 207-08.
3833 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1988).
Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
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July 1, 1977. 39 This deadline did not prevent the EPA from requiring compliance
by an earlier date. It just meant that secondary treatment standards had to be
achieved by that date. 40 As of 1989, there were over 1,500 municipalities
operating POTWs that discharge over five million gallons per day.41 Moreover,
the Regional Administrator or the Director of a Program 42 also had the
discretion to control POTWs with a design flow of below five million gallons
per day. If the Regional Administrator or the Director of a Program determines
that "circumstances warrant" such a program in order to prevent industrial
pollutants from interfering with or passing through the POTW, then a
pretreatment program must be developed. 43 If the State does not have an
approved pretreatment program, 44 then the NPDES permit issued to the
smaller POTW must have a modification clause. 45 Under these circumstances,
only the Regional Administrator may actually modify the permit. 46
In 1977, aware of delays in secondary treatment implementation caused by
failures of funding and public leadership at the local, state and federal levels,
Congress amended the Act again to permit extensions of the 1977 effluent
limitations deadline up to July 1, 1983 for certain POTWs identified by EPA.4 7
The 1977 amendments made it clear, however, that the EPA had no authority
to extend the secondary treatment standard deadlines beyond July 1, 1983.48
Congress, however, subsequently extended the deadline to July 1, 1988. 49

39

State Water Resources Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 925 (4th Cir. 1977).

40

1d.

41Parthenia B. Evans, Municipal Liability Under the CWA, 6 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T
3 (Summer 1991).
4240 C.F.R. § 403.8(a)(1992).
43

A Director is defined under 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(e)(1992) as the chief administrative
officer of a state pollution agency with both an approved NPDES permit program and
an approved State pretreatment program. For a discussion of the terms "interfering
with" and "passing through," see infra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
44For a discussion on approved pretreatment programs, see infra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text.
45

United States v. City of Geneva, No. 85 C 3917 slip. op. at 9 (N.D. 111. July 1, 1986).

46

1d.

4733 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1988); see also United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp.
189, 193 (D.N.J. 1987).
48675 F. Supp. at 194.
4933 U.S.C. § 1311(i)(1988). This extension does not extend the date of compliance
beyond July 1, 1983, in all cases. It only extends the date to July 1, 1988, when there is a
reduction in the amount of financial assistance under the Act or changed conditions
affecting the rate of construction beyond the control of the owner or operator which will
make it impossible to complete the construction by July 1, 1983. Township of Franklin
Sewerage Auth. v. Middlesex County Util. Auth., 787 F.2d 117, 123 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986).
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III. OPERATING A MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT SYSTEM

A. Primaryand Secondary Treatment of Municipal Wastewater
The treatment of wastewater comes in two stages, primary and secondary
treatment. Sewage and wastewater receive "primary treatment" when physical
processes are used to screen out solids. 50 The purpose of the primary treatment
is to remove pollutants that will either settle, such as heavier suspended solids,
or float, such as grease.5 1 Congress became convinced that providing only the
basics of primary treatment was not protecting the water quality. Consequently,
Congress shifted from concentrating on water quality and began concentrating
on limiting discharges. As will be discussed later in more detail, 52 Congress
ordered the EPA to set effluent limitations 53 based upon secondary treatment
standards. 54
SOCity of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. at 192.
51
United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602,604 (D.R.I. 1980). An example
of a "primary" sewage treatment facility was outlined in the case of Hawaii's Thousand
Friends v. City and County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368 (D. Haw. 1993). In this case,
after sewage was pumped to the plant through the collection system, it received
preliminary treatment consisting of screening to remove large objects, grit removal and
pre-aeration to facilitate grease and floatables removal. The sewage then entered the
primary clarifiers, which are designed to remove suspended solids and organic
materials through sedimentation to the bottom of the tank and by removal of floatables
from the surface. The sewage then traveled through an effluent screen (with a 1/4 inch
square mesh) and left through the outfall pipe. The effluent sewage was dispersed into
the ocean waters through a multiport diffuser.
The primary treatment defined in the case of United States v. Metropolitan Dist.
Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350 (D. Mass. 1985), was slightly different from
that outlined in Hawaii'sThousand Friends, nevertheless it shows that in both instances,
the treatment of the waste is very basic. In the Metropolitan District Commission's
Primary treatment,
large objects such as sticks and stones and other wastes such as rags
and sanitary napkins are shifted out. The effluent is then reshifted
for smaller particles such as grit and sand. Next, the sewage flows
into large holding tanks and is allowed to settle. The surface of these
tanks is skimmed to remove debris such as small sticks and human
waste. The waste that settles to the bottom of these large vats is called
sludge. The sludge remains in the holding tanks when the liquid
sewage that remains after the skimming is drawn off. The liquid is
chlorinated and released in the Harbor through a series of outfall
pipes. Additionally, the sludge itself (which is simply the filth that
settled out of the incoming raw sewage) is discharged into the Harbor
twice a day at high tide.
Id. at 1352.
52

See infra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.

53

"Effluent Limitations" are defined in 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1992) as "any restriction
imposed by the Director on quantities, discharge rates, and concentrations of
'pollutants' which are 'discharged' from 'point sources' into 'waters of the United
States,' the waters of the 'contiguous zone' or the ocean."
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The EPA responded by setting the standards three ways. First, the EPA
Administrator established discharge effluent limitations for categories of
industrial "point sources"5 5 which discharged into navigable waters. Second,
the Administrator set effluent limitations for POTWs which treated municipal
sewage or industrial wastewater. Third, the Administrator promulgated
regulations to regulate, control, and limit the toxicity of the pollutants
56
discharged into POTWs.

Unfortunately, while secondary treatment is far more effective at removing
57
The
pollutants than primary treatment, it is also far more expensive.
upgrading of some publicly owned treatment works from primary to
secondary treatment plants in some instances could cost several billion

dollars. 58

B. Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTWs)
Generally, municipalities are exposed to liability under the Clean Water Act
as a result of their Publicly Owned Treatment Works ("POTWs"). A POTW is
defined as "any device or system used in the treatment (including recycling and
reclamation) of municipal sewage or industrial waste of a liquid nature which
is owned by a 'State' or 'municipality'. This definition includes sewers, pipes
or other conveyances only if they convey wastewater to a POTW providing
59
treatment.
While the purpose of regulating the POTWs is to control what is released
into waters of the United States, there is not necessarily a correlation between

54 Hawaii'sThousand Friends,821 F. Supp. at 1372-73. "Secondary treatment" is defined
as "the use of biological treatment (i.e., digestion of microorganisms) of sewage in
addition to the physical treatment processes provided by 'primary treatment"' which
occurs when in addition to physical processes, biological processes are used to
breakdown some of the impurities remaining from the primary treatment. City of
Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. at 193; Metropolitan Dist. Comni'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1352. Thus, secondary treatment is a more sophisticated and effective method of
removing the pollutants that remain in sewage after the most basic or "primary"
treatment.
55

See supra note 31.

6

5 United States v. City of Lafayette, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1226, 1227 (N.D. Ind.
1985).
57

Id.

58

1d. In United States v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602 (D.R.I. 1980), secondary
treatment was to be accomplished by the use of an activated sludge process in which a
mixture of wastewa ter and biological sludge, called a "biomass," is agitated and aerated.
Id. at 604. The result is that the microorganisms in the biomass absorb the harmful
organisms in the wastewater, forming large clumps which settle and can be then
separated from the wastewater. As a final step in the process, before the effluent is
discharged into Narragansett Bay, it is treated with chlorine in order to kill pathogenic
or disease causing bacteria and viruses.
5940 C.F.R. § 122.2 (1992).
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effluent discharges and the quality of the body of water in which the effluent
flows. 60 In other words, the EPA saw the need to develop technical limitations
which would lead to effluent reduction by POTWs instead of concentrating on
whether a person has a right to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of
disposing wastes. 61 For POTW discharges, the EPA's concern focused
primarily on five different effluent limitations. Biological Oxygen Demand
(BOD) is the "measure of oxygen required by microorganisms to stabilize
organic matter."62 BOD materials are "organic substances in wastewater
effluent that bind oxygen thereby depleting the oxygen in the water and
degrading water quality."63 When there are low levels of oxygen in the presence
of waste loads, the oxygen is ultimately consumed in the process of the waste
flowing into the water.64 If the levels of oxygen are low enough, fish and plants
65
eventually die.
The EPA also sought to limit the Total Suspended Solids (TSS). 66 TSS indicate
the physical quantity of the solid sewage present in the water.67 The light
transmission necessary for photosynthesis which supports plant life can be
effected by very high levels of suspended solids.68 Settleable Solids (SS), also
limited by EPA, measure the settleable matter in wastewater, indicate the
effectiveness of treatment plant clarifiers, and determine the degree of
sedimentation that may occur in the water.6 9 Large amounts of settleable
wastewater solids in the water may deplete the oxygen supply thereby
strangling fish and aquatic life as a result of its adverse effect on the habitat of
60

See Munford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 394 (D. Conn. 1986).

61

See United States v. Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254, 255 (N.D. Ind. 1985).

62

United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350, 1353
n.4 (D. Mass. 1985). The oxygen demand measures the amount of oxygen consumed
through the oxidation of waste to carbon dioxide and water and also indicates the
amount of organic material present. See also Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional
Sewer Auth., 784 F.2d 1200, 1203 n.4 (4th Cir. 1986) (stating that dissolved oxygen is
essential to aquatic life and is treated as a separate entity from BOD).
63
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368,1377
(D. Haw. 1993).
64

Stoddard, 784 F.2d at 1203 n.4.

65

Id.; Metropolitan Dist. Conim'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1353 n.4.

66

TSS are the total amount of solid particulates contained in wastewater effluent.
Hawaii's Thousand Friends,821 F. Supp. at 1371.
67
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1353 n.4 (quoting Office of
Water Programs Operations, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Primer
for Wastewater Treatment 5-6 (1980)); United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 184,
193 (D.NJ. 1987).
68

Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1353 n.4 (quoting Office of
Water Programs Operations, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Primer
for Wastewater Treatment 5-6 (1980)).
69

1d.
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fish and plant life. 70 Consequently, SS is also monitored by the EPA. Finally, the
EPA closely examines "total fecal coliform" which is a measure of both fecal and
non-fecal coliform bacteria. 7 1 "Total fecal coliform" is used to indicate the
presence of harmful bacteria. 72
In the case of Stoddard v. Western CarolinaRegional Sewer Authority, the court
recognized the dangers associated with high levels of any or all wastewater
contaminants, stating,
While all lakes eventually fill in and die through a process called
eutrophication, this process is normally extremely slow. Human
intervention, however, can dramatically speed up the process,
resulting in what is known as cultural eutrophication.
In cultural eutrophication, high levels of nutrients are added to a
lake, dissolved oxygen levels are lowered, and the lake experiences a
rapid growth in rooted plants along the shore and algae in the water.
Phosphorus is a predominant element in promoting the growth of
algae, and the district court found that the Fountain Inn plant
contributes at least two-thirds of the phosphorous which flows into
Stoddard's Lake. Expert testimony at trial indicated that the plant's
discharges have caused the premature eutrophication of Stoddard's
Lake, resulting in massive algal blooms, fish kills, and odor
73
problems.
It is the releases of these and other pollutants that the EPA or a delegated state
generally seek to control through pretreatment requirements and NPDES
permits.
C. Pretreatmentand National Pollutant DischargeElimination System Permit
Requirementsfor POTWs
The potential liability that municipalities may incur for POTWs as a result
of violating the Clean Water Act primarily occurs at two stages. At the first
stage, the EPA seeks to control the introduction of wastes from non-domestic
sources. In implementing this goal, the EPA has established mechanisms and

70

1d.
"'Fecal coliform bacteria' is a type of bacteria associated with the digestive tracks
of warm blooded mammals, including humans." Id. While fecal coliform in and by itself
is not harmful, it indicates the presence of pathogenic microorganisms which can cause
diseases such as typhoid fever, amebic dysentery, diarrhea, salmonellosis,
gastroenteritis and cholera. Id.
72
Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1353 n.4 (quoting Office of
Water Programs Operations, United States Environmental Protection Agency, Primer
for Wastewater Treatment 5-6 (1980)).
71

7M784 F.2d at 1204.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/4
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procedures known as pretreatment standards. 74 The purpose of regulating
pretreatment pollutants is three-fold:
(a) To prevent the introduction of pollutants into POTWs which will
interfere with the operation of a POTW, including interference with its
use or disposal of municipal sludge;
(b) To prevent the introduction of pollutants into POTWs which will
pass through the treatment works or would otherwise be incompatible
with such works; and
(c) To improve opportunities to reccle and reclaim municipal and
industrial wastewaters and sludges.
At the second stage, the EPA seeks to control the release of effluent through
its NPDES permit program. While both the pretreatment and NPDES permit
programs seek to reduce the amount of pollutants released into waters of the
United States, each program is administered differently. Moreover, the role of
the municipality or POTW is markedly different at both stages as well.
1. Pretreatment
The term pretreatment has been defined as "the reduction of the amount of
pollutants, the elimination of pollutants, or the alteration of the nature of
pollutant properties in wastewater prior to or in lieu of discharging or
otherwise introducing such pollutants into a POTW."76 Reducing or altering
the pollutants may be obtained by physical, chemical or biological processes,
78
process changes or by other means, 77 except as prohibited by EPA.
"Appropriate pretreatment technology includes control equipment, such as
equalization tanks or facilities, for protection against surges or slug loadings
that might interfere with or otherwise might be incompatible with the
POTW." 79 If the "wastewater from a regulated process is mixed in an
equalization facility with unregulated wastewater or with wastewater from
another regulated process, the effluent... must meet an adjusted pretreatment
limit calculated in accordance with [40 C.F.R.] § 403.6(e). " 80
The EPA regulations governing the pretreatment of pollutants seek three
levels of administrative control. First, most major POTWs will be required to
develop a locally run pretreatment program which will ensure that
non-domestic users of the municipal system comply with pretreatment
7440 C.F.R. § 403.1 (1992).
75

Id. § 403.2.

76

Id. § 403.3(q).

77

1d.
1d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(d)).

78
79

1d.
80Id.
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requirements. 81 Second, where POTWs are not required to develop a local
program, NPDES States with approved pretreatment programs will have first
line responsibility for enforcing pretreatment requirements. 82 Third, the
83
regulations also discuss establishing and reporting Pretreatment Standards.
The pretreatment regulations define in great detail what constitutes an
approvable pretreatment program. 84 At a minimum, the program must
contain: 1) a survey of industrial users and their actual and potential
discharges to the treatment system; 2) a detailed technical evaluation, including
industrial use monitoring and laboratory analysis, of the potential for
interference with the operation of the treatment system, the discharge of
pollutants that would adversely impact receiving waters, and an analysis of
sludge to prevent interference with the POTW and to prevent inappropriate
sludge disposal; 3) a municipal ordinance that allows the POTW to implement
and enforce both categorical pretreatment standards and local limits that are
needed to prevent interference 85 (if the local pretreatment standards are more
stringent than the federal standards, the local standards will apply);86 and 4) a
plan for implementing the pretreatment program which generally includes an
identification of user reporting requirements, inspection procedures,
87
budgeting for equipment, and support personnel.
POTWs must submit their proposed plans to the approval authority. Upon
a preliminary determination that the program submission meets the
requirements of Section 403 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the approval
authority will issue a public notice and if there are no significant comments or
no requests for a public hearing, the plan will be approved. 88 Finally, it should
be noted that the EPA established regulations relating directly to the
89
determination and reporting of pretreatment standards.
The reasons for regulating pretreatment of pollutants into POTWs is that
industrial discharges to POTWs are known to be the source of significant

8 1General

Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources, 46 Fed. Reg. 9404

(1981).
82

Id.

83

Id.

84 See 40 C.F.R.
§§ 403.8(0, 403.9(b)(1992); United States v. City of Lafayette, 24 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1226, 1227 (N.D. Ind. 1985).
85City of Lafayette, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1228.
8 6Intemational

Union, UAW v. Amerace Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.J. 1990).
of Lafayette, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1228.
881d. (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.9(e), 403.11(b)(c)(1992)).
89City of Lafayette, 24 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1228 (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 403.6, .7,.12,
.13, .15).
8 7City
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problems. 90 For example, a number of the pollutants discharged by industrial
users of the POTWs are substances for which there is evidence that such
pollutants are carcinogenic, mutagenic, and/or teratogenic. 91 Other pollutants
are known to have acute toxic effects on human or aquatic organisms at
persistent in the
sufficiently high concentrations. Many of these pollutants are 92
environment and some bioaccumulate and enter food chains.
If pollutants which enter into a POTW exceed legal limits, then those
pollutants can cause several problems. First, they can interfere with the
operation of the POTW.93 The interference can cause the POTW to do an
inadequate job of treating normal domestic wastes as well as industrial wastes.
As a result, the POTW can be prevented from meeting its permit
requirements. 94 The EPA sees the identification and regulation of an
interference problem as a local responsibility.95 Consequently, because the
presence of an interference problem is so dependent on local conditions, a
against
POTW is required to develop specific limits for industrial users to guard
96
interference with the operation of the municipal treatment works.
The second problem is associated with managing the sludge at the POTW.
Specifically, some toxic pollutants that are removed from the effluent stream
by treatment at the POTW enter the POTW's sludge and can contribute to
sludge management problems. The effect of the commingling of the sludge
with industrial pollutants, particularly metals, can limit the sludge
management alternatives available to the POTW and increase the cost to the
public of providing adequate sludge management. 9 7 In some cases, the
improper management of sludges contaminated with metals and other toxic
pollutants can result in uptake of these pollutants by crops in the human food
chain or leaching 98 of these pollutants into the groundwater.99 Because of the
problem and the threat associated with sludge management, the EPA believed
it necessary to regulate the pollutants through categorical pretreatment
standards.1 00
90General Pretreatment Regulations for Existing and New Sources, 46 Fed. Reg. 9404,
9406 (1981) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 125, 403).
91

Id.

92

Id.

93
94

Id.
[d.

9546 Fed. Reg. at 9406.
96
97

Id.
1d.

98

Id. Leaching derives from the term Leachate which has been defined as materials
that pollute water as it sweeps through solid waste.
99

1d.

10046 Fed. Reg. at 9406.
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Third, even when the inhibition/interference and sludge management
problems mentioned above have been addressed, there still exist many
industrial toxic pollutants that do not receive adequate treatment in most
POTWs. These toxic pollutants in essence pass through the POTWs with levels
of pollutants that would be unacceptable if the POTW were an industrial direct
discharger. 101 These toxic pollutants which pass through the POTW can
prevent reuse of municipal wastewaters and the productive recycling of
organic matter and nutrients in land treatment systems. 102 They can also
prevent the attainment of water quality standards and increase the cost to
consumers of treating drinking water.103 Consequently, like pollutants that
interfere with sludge use or disposal, pollutants which generally pass-through
the POTW in unacceptable concentrations or amounts may be subject to

regulation through categorical pretreatment standards. 104

2. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit System
The 1972 Amendments readily prohibit the discharge of any pollutant to
navigable waters from a point source unless the discharge is authorized by an
NPDES permit. 105 Under this system, the EPA, or a delegated State, issues the
NPDES permit to an individual discharger. 106 In other words, the EPA may
issue, administer, and enforce NPDES permits itself, or it may delegate much
of that responsibility to the State. 107 In States where the delegation has
occurred, the States assume primary responsibility for issuing the NPDES
permits. 108 Under this delegated program, States may only administer a
program upon the EPA's approval.109 The EPA may require a delegated State's
submitted plan to be modified or revised, but when a State's plan is in
compliance with EPA guidelines under Section 304(h)(2), 110 and the submitted
program is supported by adequate authority to achieve the ends of Sections
402(b)(1)-(9), the EPA is required to approve the State's program and suspend
10 1

d.
102Id.
103 Id.
10 4

1d.
10533 U.S.C. § 1311(a)(1988). That section provides "Except as in compliance with this
section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 1344 of this title, the discharge of any
pollutant by any person shall be unlawful." Id.
10633 U.S.C. § 1342 (1988); United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1350,1352 (D. Mass. 1985); United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp.
1110, 1114 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
107 City of Menorninee,727 F. Supp. at 1114.
108Id.
109

d.
110d
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EPA's issuance of permits under Section 402 as to those navigable waters
subject to such program. 111 A State must forward a copy of each permit
application to the EPA for it's review. 112 The EPA has the discretion to waive
review for particular classes of point sources or for a particular permit
113
application.
A delegated State must inform the EPA of every action related to the permit
and forward to the EPA a copy of any new or modified permit proposed to be
issued by the State. 114 If the EPA objects to the issuance of the permit in writing
and within 90 days from the date of being notified of the proposed permit, then
the permit cannot be issued. 115 Similarly, if the EPA objects to the proposed
permit as being outside of the scope of the guidelines and requirements of the
Act within 90 days of the date of transmittal of the proposed permit, then the
delegated State may not issue a permit.116 Under both scenarios, the EPA's
objection must contain a statement outlining the effluent limitations and the
conditions the permit would include if issued by it.117 In short, the EPA retains
final authority to review State issued permits, including permits issued in
delegated States, to ensure compliance with guidelines and requirements set
118
forth in the Act.
If the EPA objects to the proposed permit, the delegated State may request a
public hearing on the objection, or may submit a revised permit for EPA review,
provided the request is made in a timely manner.119 If the delegated State fails
to exercise these options, or if the State and the EPA reach an impasse, exclusive
issuance passes to the EPA. 120 On the other hand, if a State or the EPA properly
issues an NPDES permit, the permit remains in force unless it is revoked,
suspended or modified. 121 The usual life of a permit is five years. Generally, if
a permittee applies for a new permit or modification of an existing permit
before the permit's expiration, the effluent limitations, terms and conditions

11133 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(1)(1988).
112

1d. § 1342(d)(1).

3

11 Id. § 1342 (d)(3).
114

1d. § 1342 (d)(1).

5

11 Id. § 1342 (d)(2)(A).
116d. § 1342 (d)(2)(B).
117 United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1114-15 (W.D. Mich. 1989).
118ld. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(e)); Ford Motor Co. v. United States EPA, 567 F.2d
661, 664, 669-72 (6th Cir. 1977).
119 City of Menoniinee, 727 F. Supp. at 1114-15.
120

1d. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(d)(4); 40 C.F.R. § 123.12(g)(1979)); Champion Int'l Corp.
v. United States EPA, 648 F. Supp. 1390, 1399 (W.D.N.C. 1986), vacated on other grounds,

850 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1988).
121 City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. at 1115.
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remain in effect until issuance of a new or modified permit.122 Furthermore, as
a general rule, the new or modified permit is supposed to be no less stringent
than the permit before it.123
IV. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH MUNICIPAL WASTEWATER TREATMENT
SYSTEMS

A. FinancialAssistancefrom the FederalGovernment
In 1989, the EPA reported that over two-thirds of the 15,600 wastewater
treatment plants in the United States failed to comply with the CWA
standards. 124 Moreover, approximately 50% of the municipalities with
violating plants have severe financial problems and have per capita incomes
that are less than 75% the national average. 125 To complicate the problem even
further, in 1989, the EPA admitted that improving these facilities would use up
it's budget for the next seventeen years.1 26 Because of the catastrophic costs to
low income communities, Senator John D. Rockefeller stated that forcing these
communities to comply with the CWA without providing financial assistance
would force them into bankruptcyl 2 7
Title II of the Clean Water Act establishes a program of federal grants to
states, municipalities and intergovernmental agencies for the construction of
POTWs. 128 The purpose of the funding is to assist in financing the facilities so
that they can reduce the effluent as prescribed in the Act.1 2 9 Under Title II,
"grants may only be awarded to the most cost-effective project for addressing
a water pollution problem in a specific geographic area. "13 0 By using economic
and social considerations, the applicant for a federal construction grant must

1221d. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(1)(B)).
123 United States v. Louisville &Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 36 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1465, 1469 (6th Cir. 1993) (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(a)(B)).
124
Glenn E. Deegan, Note, Judicial Enforcement of State and Municipal Compliance with
the Clean Water Act: Can the Courts Succeed?, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 765, 767 n.24
(1992) (citing Douglas Jehl, Clean Water Cost Put at 83.5 Billion, L.A. Times, Feb. 15,1989
atA4.).
125
/d. at 767 n.27 (citing Sewage Treatment: Rockefeller to ProposeDeadline Extensionfor
Municipal Sewage Treatment Requirements, 19 Env't Rep. (BNA) 177 (June 3, 1988)).
126 Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 36 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1469.
127Deegan, supranote 124.
128
State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 923 (4th Cir. 1977).
129/d.
130City of Mount Clemens v. United States EPA, 917 F.2d 908, 910 n.3 (6th Cir. 1990)
(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1298); City of Garland v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 870 F.2d 320,325 (5th Cir.
1989).
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss4/4

16

1993]

MUNICIPALITIES AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT

show that its project is the most economical means of meeting effluent and
131
water quality goals in a specific geographic area.
Before any grant is given, there are complex procedures which must be
followed, including certification of the project by the States, and a
determination by the State that the project has priority over other works within
the State.1 32 Furthermore, the applicant must submit to the EPA, or its delegate,
a completed facilities plan, which includes an environmental impact statement
and cost effectiveness analysis. 133 The purpose of the cost-effectivness analysis
is "to determine which waste treatment management system or component
part will result in the minimum total resource costs over time to meet Federal
State or local requirements." 134 Such projects would include, but are not limited
to, construction, operation, maintenance and replacement costs. Furthermore,
the EPA must establish that the applicant has agreed to pay the non-federal
costs of the project and has made adequate provision for assuring proper and
efficient operation of the facility in accordance with a plan of operation
approved by the State Water Pollution Control Agency.135 The EPA must also
determine that the size and capacity of the POTW relates directly to the needs
served by the POTW, including sufficient reserve capacity, and that no
specification for bids in connection with the POTW has been drafted in a
manner as to contain proprietary, exclusionary, or discriminatory
requirements. 136 In short, only when an application is made to the EPA, the
State certifies the project as having priority, and the EPA approves the
application after the applicant has followed the required procedures, can
137
funding be obligated.
Under Title II, funds are available to be obligated for one year. If there are
any unobligated funds at the end of the fiscal year, then the EPA is required to
reallot the funds. 138 While the funds are realloted, the EPA is barred from
issuing the funds back to the State which did not use the funds earlier.13 9

131City of Mount Clemens, 917 F.2d at 910 n.3; City of Garland,870 F.2d at 325.
132 United States v. Louisville & Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist., 36 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1465, 1466 (6th Cir. 1993).
133City of Mount Clemens, 917 F.2d at 910 n.3 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 35.917).
1341d. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1298(b)).
13 5
United States v. City of Detroit, 720 F.2d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 1983).
136

1d.

37

1 [d.
138

1d. at 446-47 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1285(b)(1)).

139

1d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 35.2010(b)).
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B. Municipal Liability Under the Clean Water Act
1. Background
With nearly two-thirds of the large POTWs violating the Clean Water Act,
establishing the liability of municipalities has been relatively simple since the
Clean Water Act is a strict liability statute. 140 A violation of the Act occurs when
(1) a municipality "(2) discharges a pollutant (3) into navigable waters (4)
through a point source (5) while not in compliance with the provisions of the
Act, including NPDES permit standards." 141 While good faith efforts 142 and
willingness to comply 143 with the Act are relevant when assessing the amount
of civil penalties, they are irrelevant when establishing liability.144 In other
words, courts believe for purposes of liability "[e]xcuses are irrelevant; under
the Act the party must either achieve the discharge levels it has been allowed,
or pay the consequences of its discharge, or stop discharging.' 145
As stated earlier, the NPDES permit program provides an exception to the
general pollution prohibition, allowing those with permits to discharge
wastewater, within prescribed effluent limitations, directly into navigable
waters. 146 "An NPDES permit is not a contract, rather it is a legally enforceable
rule drafted by a regulatory agency. As such, it is akin to any agency regulation
or rule, which a court would normally interpret." 14 7 Section 1311(a) of the CWA,
however, clearly states that discharging without, or in violation of, a permit is
a violation of the Act. 148

140Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49 (1987);
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. Honolulu, 821 F.Supp. 1368 (D. Haw. 1993); United States
v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 189 (D.N.J. 1987); Mumford Cove Ass'n v. Town of
Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392 (D. Conn. 1986); United States v. Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp.
254 (N.D. Ind. 1985); United States v. Louisville &Jefferson County Metro. Sewer Dist.,
36 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1465 (6th Cir. 1993).
141
Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. at 393-94; United States v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 438
F. Supp. 945, 948 (W.D. Tenn. 1976).
142

See generally Gwaltney of Smitlfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. 49; United States v. Winchester
Mun. Utils., 944 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1991); Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. 1368;

International Union, UAW v. Amerace Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.J. 1990); Town of
Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392; Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254; United States v. City of

Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602, 604 (D.R.I. 1980); United States v. Metropolitan Dist.
Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350 (D. Mass. 1985)
143

See supra note 142.

144

See supra note 142.

45

1 United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 189, 198 (D.N.J. 1987).
United States v. City of Menominee, 727 F. Supp. 1110, 1114 (W.D. Mich. 1989).

146

14 7 Califomia Pub. Interest Research Group v. Shell Oil Co., 840 F. Supp. 712,716 (N.D.
Cal. 1993).
148 Environmental Protection Agency v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S.
200,205 (1976); Na tural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1374-75
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Establishing such a violation is very basic. For example, while the discharge
monitoring reports are public records, 14 9 they may also be used to establish
liability.1 50 A violation of a monthly or weekly average permit limitation
constitutes a violation of each day of the relevant month or week. 15 1 This is true
even if a violation is technical or insignificant in nature. 152 Thus, most
prosecutors can meet their prima facie burden with very little effort.
When an action is brought against a municipality for violating the Clean
Water Act, the State is joined as a party defendant. 153 As joined, the State is
liable for any judgment or expenses a municipality is prevented by state law
from being able to pay.1 54 In federal court, States cannot bring actions against
municipalities for violating the CWA, either as a "person" or "citizen" as defined
in the Act.155 If state law allows, however, the State may assert a claim in state
court. 156

Like the State, the EPA's role is extremely limited when a violation of the
CWA is alleged. The Act imposes a non-discretionary duty on the EPA to take
action to prevent permit violations, including issuing compliance orders by the
Administrator and filing civil lawsuits. 15 7 Thus, the EPA may not have any
authority to avoid moving against a municipality if the municipality violates
its permit. 158 Moreover, in assessing liability, courts are not bound by internal

(D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. Town of Lowell, 637 F. Supp. 254, 258 (N.D. Ind. 1985);
Student Pub. Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 600 F. Supp. 1479,
1485 (D.N.J. 1985).
149

See supra note 18 and accompanying text.

150

Mumford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 394 (D. Conn. 1986);
Connecticut Fund for the Env't v. Job Plating Co., 623 F. Supp. 207 (D. Conn. 1985);
Chesapeake Bay Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 611 F. Supp. 1542 (E.D. Va.
1985), affd, 791 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1986), and vacated in 484 U.S. 49 (1987); Chesapeake
Bay Found. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp. 440 (D. Md. 1985); Student Pub.
Interest Research Group of N.J., Inc. v. Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 1528
(D.N.J. 1984),affd, 759 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Raytheon Co., 22 Env't Rep.
Cas. (BNA) 1050 (D. Mass. 1984).
151Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. at 394; Chesapeake Bay Found., 611 F. Supp. at 1552-53;
United States v. Amoco Oil Co., 580 F. Supp. 1042, 1045 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
152Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. at 395; Sierra Club v. Simpkins Indus., 617 F. Supp.
1120, 1127-28 (D. Md. 1985); Fritzche, Dodge & Olcott, Inc., 579 F. Supp. at 1538.
15333 U.S.C. § 1319(e)(1988).
154

1d.

15SUnited States v. City of Hopewell, 508 F. Supp. 526 (E.D. Va. 1980).
156

Id. at 529.

157

United States v. City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. 189, 199 (D.N.J. 1987); South
Carolina Wildlife Fed'n v. Alexander, 457 F. Supp. 118, 130-34 (D.S.C. 1978); United
States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D.Ariz. 1975).
158 City of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. at 199.
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EPA documents, 15 9 nor will they consider the fact that the EPA is partly
responsible for the failure.1 60 In essence, the liability net against a municipality
for violating the Clean Water Act is extremely wide.
There are, however, two instances worth noting in which municipalities may
avoid liability when the terms and conditions of the permits are violated. The
"upset" regulation temporarily forgives non-compliance due to extraordinary
circumstances.1 61 An upset is defined as "an exceptional incident in which there
is unintentional and temporary non-compliance with technology based permit
effluent limitations because of factors beyond the reasonable control of the
permittee."162
An upset does not include non-compliance to the extent that the
non-compliance was caused by operation error, improperly designed
treatment facilities, inadequate treatment facilities, lack of preventive
maintenance or careless or improper operation. 163 There are detailed notice
requirements which the permittee must establish to meet the definition of
upset. 164 These requirements include 1) notifying within 24 hours the EPA of
the upset, and 2) providing a written follow-up notice within five days
specifying a) the date and time of the upset b) the reasons for the upset; and c)
65
the steps that have been or will be taken to correct the problem.1
The burden of proof for establishing an upset is on the permittee. 166 By
placing the burden of proof and the responsibility to comply with the extensive
notice requirements on the permittee through regulations, the EPA sought to
ensure that "prosecution for permit violations be swift and simple."167 The swift
and simple prosecution approach was sought by the EPA to avoid long,
drawn-out inquiries into the causes of the violations. 168

159Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth., No. CIV.A. 86-7220, 1988 WL
48552 at *5(E.D. Pa. May 12, 1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 57 (3d. Cir. 1989).
16OCity of Hoboken, 675 F. Supp. at 200.
161United States v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1350,1359
(D. Mass. 1985).
162
1d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(1)).
163

1d.
Id. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(n)(3)(iii)).

164
165

1d. (citing 40 C.F.R. § 122.41(a)(6)(ii)(B)).

66

1 Metropolitan Dist. Conrn'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1359 (citing 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.41(n)(4)).
167Id. at 1360 n.11; 44 Fed. Reg. 32, 863 (1979); 40 C.F.R. Part 403.
168Metropolitan Dist. Conn'n, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1360 n.11.
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The rules for an "upset"defense for pretreatment violations are similar but
not identical to the upset regulations for an NPDES permit violation. 169 Upon
becoming aware of a violation, the discharger notifies the POTW, not the EPA,
of the violation within 24 hours. 170 The discharger must also repeat the
sampling within 30 days.171 All "dischargers must 'promptly notify the POTW
in advance of any substantial change in the volume or character of pollutants
in their discharge'." 172 If this discharger notifies the POTW of the occurrences
mentioned herein as required by the pretreatment regulations, then it may
become the responsibility of the POTW to inform the EPAor the delegated state
agency of the change of conditions. 173 If the POTW fails to report these changes,
then the POTW could be held liable for violating the Act.174 Furthermore, if an
inhibition or disruption of the POTW is caused not by the discharge of the
industrial user but by a mistake or malfunction at the POTW, then the POTW
may be held liable for the inhibition or interference.1 75
Congress has also provided a second means by which municipalities can
avoid liability without complying with a traditional NPDES permit. In 1977,
Congress amended the Act with section 301(h), to include, in certain
extraordinary circumstances, a waiver from secondary treatment for
municipalities discharging from deep ocean outfalls.176 The Act only allows
waiver permits in very limited circumstances which the EPA has regulated to
process the Section 301(h) waivers. 177 Moreover, the EPA must make several
factual findings before a waiver can be granted. 178 Once the EPA recommends
that a waiver be granted, the decision can be appealed and the EPA cannot issue
the waiver until a detailed appeal and hearing process has been completed. 179

169Cf, International Union, UAW v. Amerace Corp., 740 F. Supp. 1072 (D.N.J. 1990)
(noting that an upset defense is not available when a pretreatment violation is caused
by operational error, improperly designed treatment facilities, lack of preventive
maintenance or improper operation; moreover, the defense is only available when the
POTW was properly notified of the upset).
17 0

d. at 1080 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 40 3 .12(g)(2)).

171Id.
172

Id. at 1080 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(j)).

17 3

Id.

174

International Union, UAW, 740 F. Supp. at 1080 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 403.12(j)).

175

Id. at 1081; National Ass'n of Metal Finishers v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 640-41 (3rd Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds sub norn. Chemical Mfgs. Ass'n v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
176Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368,1392
(D. Haw. 1993).
177

Id.

1 78

1d.

1 79

Id.
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In short, attempting to gain a waiver under Section 301(h) could be a very long,
drawn-out process.
2. Citizen Suits
Federal, state and local agencies are not the only group of individuals that
may bring an enforcement action against municipalities for violating the Clean
Water Act. Section 505 of the Act allows suits in the absence of either federal or
state prosecution under the CWA or a comparable state statue. 180 In other
words, if the federal government or a State is diligently pursuing a claim under
the CWA or comparable state law, a citizen suit cannot be brought. 181 Moreover,
if an action is brought by the federal or a state government, no citizen suit can
be brought, for any purpose, including even if its only purpose is to seek

18033 U.S.C. § 1365(a) &(b)(Supp. 1993) states:
(a) Authorization; jurisdiction. Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section...
any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf(1) against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this Act or (B)
an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation, or
(2) against the Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the
Administrator to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not
discretionary with the Administrator.
The district courts shall have jurisdiction, without regard to the amount in controversy
or the citizenship of the parties, to enforce such an effluent standard or limitation, or
such an order, or to order the Administrator to perform such act or duty, as the case
may be, and to apply any appropriate civil penalties under section 1319 of this title.
(b) Notice. No action may be commenced(1) under subsection (a)(1) of this section(A) prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice of the alleged
violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State in which the alleged
violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order, or
(B) if the Administrator or State has commenced and is diligently prosecuting a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State
to require compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any
such action in a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a
matter of right.
(2) under subsection (a)(2) of this section prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of such action to the Administrator,
except that such action may be brought immediately after such notification in the case
of an action under this section respecting a violation of sections 1316 and 1317(a) of this
title. Notice under this subsection shall be given in such manner as the Administrator
shall prescribe by regulation.
See also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 53 (1987);
New YorkCoastal Fisherman's Ass'n. v. New York CityDept. of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp.
162,165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
18133 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6)(A)(ii) (1988); New York CoastalFisherman'sAss'n., 772 F. Supp.
at 165.
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injunctive relief. 182 The bar on citizen suits when the government is pursuing
an enforcement action implies that citizen suits are meant to supplement rather
than to supplant government action. The Senate report on the CWA
acknowledged that "the Committee intends the great volume of enforcement
actions to be brought by the State, and that citizen suits are proper only if the
federal, state and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement
responsibility."1 83 If the federal or state government fails to diligently pursue
the action, then irrespective of whether there is a consent decree or even a court
action, a citizen suit may be brought. 184
Citizen suits may be brought only for a violation of a permit condition which
is in effect under the Act. 185 Before a suit may be instituted, the citizens filing
the suit must give notice to the alleged violator, the EPA, and the State in which
the alleged violation occurred. 18 6 If the EPA or the State fails to commence an
enforcement action within 60 days, then a citizen suit may be filed. 187 The suit,
however, must allege that there is an ongoing violation and that he or she has
standing to raise the ongoing violation. A citizen plaintiff may establish
ongoing violations two ways: 1)by proving violations that continue on or after
the date the complaint is filed, or 2) by producing evidence that a trier of fact
could reasonably find a continuing likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent
or sporadic violations. 188 Ongoing violations do not cease to be ongoing until
the date there is no real likelihood of repetition.189 To establish standing, the
citizen plaintiff must show that: 1) he personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury as a result of the illegal conduct of the defendant; 2) the injury
can be traced to the alleged actions; and 3) the citizen plaintiffs are likely to be
redressed by a favorable decision. 190 If the citizen plaintiffs prevail, they may

18233 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)(1988); Friends of the Earth v. Consol. Rail Corp., 768 F.2d
57, 63 (2d Cir. 1985); New York Fisherman'sAss'n., 772 F. Supp. at 165.
183Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 60 (citing S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971),
reprinted in 2 A LEGISLATIvE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT

AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1482 (1973)).
18 4
New YorkCoastal Fisherman'sAss'n., 772 F.Supp at 168, seealso Mumford Cove Ass'n
v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 396 (D. Conn. 1986) (noting that a state modifying
order after withdrawing action is not diligently pursuing).
18SGwaltney of Smitlfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(0)..
18 6Gwaltney of Smitlfield, Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B)).

187/d.
18 8

Sierra Club v. Union Oil Co., 853 F.2d 667, 671 (9th Cir. 1988); Chesapeake Bay
Found. v. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd., 844 F.2d 170, 171-72 (4th Cir. 1988); State Line
Fishing &Hunting Club, Inc. v. City of Waskom, 754 F. Supp. 1104,1110 (E.D. Tex. 1991).
189ChesapeakeBay Found., 844 F.2d at 171-72; City of Waskom, 754 F. Supp. at 1110.
190Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church &
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982); City of Waskom, 754 F. Supp. at 1110.
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have an injunction granted and civil penalties assessed. 191 They may also
192
recover attorney fees.
C. Imposition of Civil Penaltieson MunicipalitiesWho Fail to Comply with Their
National Pollutant DischargeElimination System Permits
Without the necessary grant funding, one would suspect that the EPA and
even citizen groups would be rather lenient on municipalities and attempt to
work with them instead of trying to usurp massive civil penalties from the
municipalities. While in some instances this does occur, 193 this is the exception
rather than the rule. 194 It appears that the reason these groups seek civil
penalties is deterrence. 195 In other words, "[tihe purpose of the civil penalty is
not to generate revenue. Rather, the penalty is punitive in nature, serving the
196
purposes of both retribution and deterrence, in addition to restitution."
Consequently, EPA citizen groups, and even some courts, believe that penalty
must be high enough so that the discharger cannot "write it off" as an acceptable
197
environmental trade-off for doing business.
"Congress has established a clear statutory scheme for courts to determine
appropriate penalties for violations of the Clean Water Act. Section 309(d) of
the Act provides a two-step process for courts to use in setting the appropriate
civil penalty. First, [the] court is to calculate the maximum penalties that can

19
1Gwaltney of Snitlfield,Ltd., 484 U.S. at 59; New York Coastal Fisherman's Ass'n. v.
New York City Dept. of Sanitation, 772 F. Supp. 162,165 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
192
Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128,1142-43 (11th Cir.
1990); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d)(1988).
193United States v. Winchester Mun. Utils., 944 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1991). In Winchester
Municipal, the United States offered to settle for $40,000 in civil penalties
notwithstanding the fact that the statutory maximum in penalties exceeded $50 million.
Later, the government reduced its civil penalty proposal to $10,000. Id. at 303.
194 Cf. Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth., No. CIV.A. 86-7220,1988 WL
48552 (E.D. Pa. May 12,1988), rev'd, 877 F.2d 57 (3d Cir. 1989). In Profittplaintiffs sought
a penalty of $4,837,025 for violations of the Act between January 1, 1983 to January 31,
1987. The court, however, refused to impose any type of civil penalty. In doing so Judge
Newcomer stated:
I do not make this determination lightly. While the court acknowledges
the serious nature of the Authority's violations and the continuous history
of the violations, the court finds very persuasive both the lack of an economic benefit from non-compliance and the Authority's good faith efforts
to comply with its permit.
Id. at *9.
195
Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1394
(D. Haw. 1993).
196
New York v. Town of Wallkill, 572 N.Y.S. 2d 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
19 7
Hawaii'sThousand Friends,821 F. Supp. at 1394; PIRG v. Powell Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 720 F. Supp. 1158, 1166 (D.N.J. 1989) ("[A] civil penalty must be high enough to
insure that polluters cannot simply absorb the penalty as a cost of doing business.").
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be awarded against a violator of the Act."198 In calculating the maximum
amount of civil penalties that could be assessed, the court must: "(1) determine
the categories of violations; (2) add up the number of daily violations in each
category; (3) total the violations for each category; and (4) multiply this total
by $25,000."199
"Second, by using the maximum penalty as a guideline, the court is to set the
200
Section 309(d)
actual penalties by analyzing the specific statutory factors."
penalties:
civil
assessing
test
in
uses a six-pronged
(1) The seriousness of the violation or violators;
(2) The economic benefit, if any, resulting from the violation;
(3) Any history of such violation;
(4) Good faith efforts to comply with applicable requirements;
and
(5) Economic impact of the penalty on the
201violation;
(6) Other matters as Justice may require.
2
While courts have differed on whether civil penalties are mandatory, 02 the
courts are uniform in determining that the amounts to be assessed are left to
the discretion of the court. 203 That is because Congress' use of the words "shall
consider" suggests that in arriving at a dollar figure for penalties, the court is
to take into consideration each listed factor as well as any additional factors the
204
The intent and
court believes has a bearing on the question of penalties.
purpose of allowing courts to impose penalties is to better serve the underlying
purpose of voluntary compliance by municipalities. 205 If the court chooses not
to impose the maximum penalty, "it must reduce the fine in accordance with
the factors spelled out in [the Act], clearly indicating the weight it gives to the
206
factors in the statute and the factual findings that support its conclusion."
For example, if the facts and circumstance warrant, courts can exercise its

198

Hawaii's Thousand Friends, 821 F. Supp. at 1395.

199

1d.
Id.; see also Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d 1128, 1142
(11th Cir. 1990).
20133 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1988).
200

202 ConpareUnited States v. Winchester Mun. Utils., 944 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1991) with
Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth., No. CIV.A. 86-7220, 1988 WL 48552
(E.D. Pa. May 12, 1988); New York v. Town of Wallkill, 572 N.Y.S.2d 758 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1991).
203
See supra note 202.
204Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d at 1142.
205Town of Wallkhill, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 760.
206Tyson Foods, Inc., 897 F.2d at 1142; Hawaii's Thousand Friends v. City & County of
Honolulu, 821 F. Supp. 1368, 1395 (D. Haw. 1993).
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discretion by imposing a nominal penalty of $1 or less per day per violation. 207
A nominal penalty such as this could be imposed where the violator acted in
good faith to voluntarily comply with the relevant requirements, but was
frustrated through no fault of his own by events which left him no alternative
but to violate the Act.208 Similarly, "ability to pay and litigation considerations
are included in the factors to be considered in arriving at a just and equitable
9
decision."20
V. WHY THE CURRENT MUNICIPAL LIABILITY SCHEME UNDER THE CLEAN
WATER ACT IS A FAILURE, AND WHAT STEPS ARE NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE
MAXIMUM COMPLIANCE BY MUNICIPALITIES

A careful review of municipal liability under the Clean Water Act reveals one
startling fact: the Act as it now exists is a failure. The CWA is a failure not
because of the pretreatment regulations or effluent limitations set by the EPA.
Those standards are based upon technological and statistical scientific
analyses. Moreover, the standards set were subject to review and comment
procedures leading up to establishment of the regulations. 2 10 Similarly, the
CWA is not a failure because of the liability it imposes. As a matter of fact, with
nearly two-thirds of the POTWs failing to comply with the CWA, it is readily
admitted that something must be done to correct the system's deficiencies.
Furthermore, the Act does not fail because it allows citizen suits. Citizen suits
are nothing more than a back-up to the state and federal government
enforcement mechanisms. If the government fails to take appropriate action,
citizens who will be affected by a municipality's noncompliance can take action
to protect their rights. Where the act fails is with the right 211- and according
to some courts, the obligation 212 - of the courts to assess civil penalties against
the municipalities.
Civil penalties assessed against municipalities do not accomplish the goals
they seek to achieve. The purpose of assessing civil penalties against
municipalities is to punish them for violating the CWA, and to deter others
from doing the same. 213 Yet, in seeking to punish municipalities who violate
the Act, and attempting to deter others, an erroneous assumption is made.
Namely, that most municipalities have the ability to control and ultimately
change their noncompliance status. Unfortunately, without the necessary

20 7
208

Toun of Wallkiill, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 760.

1d.

209Work v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 720 F. Supp. 132, 138 (W.D. Ark. 1989), affd, 921 F.2d
1394 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 414 (1993).
21 0
Mumford Cove Ass'n v. Town of Groton, 640 F. Supp. 392, 394 (D. Conn. 1986).
211

See supra note 202.

212od.

213See sutpra note 196.
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funding from the government or private sources, municipalities often lack
adequate funding to correct the problem at a POTW. Municipalities are
different from private parties. The treatment of the wastewater for
municipalities is essential. The essence of the relevant difference between
municipalities and private parties is that municipalities cannot shut-off the
publicly owned treatment works to stop the civil penalty clock from ticking. If
they do, then the health of the municipalities' citizens would be jeopardized.
Such an action would be in direct conflict with the purpose of the Act which is
to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.
Many supporters of issuing civil penalties against municipalities who
violate the CWA would argue that the violations have occurred because of the
municipalities' refusal to seek adequate grant funding. Unfortunately, this is
not necessarily true. The grant program as a whole has been extremely
ineffective in helping POTWs meet effluent limitations. The reason is that the
money authorized has been grossly inadequate. 2 14 Moreover, disbursements
of the authorized funds have been substantially delayed and decreased by
Presidential and Congressional activities. For example, in 1972 when the
Amendments were passed, they were passed over President Nixon's veto.
Nixon subsequently authorized "no more than $2 billion of the [$5 billion]
authorized for the fiscal year 1973, and no more than $3 billion of the [$6 billion]
authorized for fiscal year 1974.11215

In 1987, the CWA was amended by the Water Quality Act.2 16 The Act only
authorized $18 billion over nine years for the construction of municipal
treatment systems. 2 17 Equally important is the fact that the 1987 Amendments
sought to phase-out federal assistance for municipal wastewater treatment
plant construction. The grant program was only reauthorized through fiscal
year 1990 for a total of $9.6 billion.2 18 After that, the grant program was replaced
by an $8.4 billion program through fiscal year 1994 that would provide seed
money for states to establish a permanent state run revolving loan funding
programs. The revolving fund program requires states to contribute funding
and does not give money to municipalities. It only permits municipalities to
apply for low interest loans for the construction of sewage treatment systems.
In short, a drastic, new, financial burden is now placed on municipalities to
find adequate funding to correct any problems associated with the POTWs. 219
2 14

State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1977).
1d. at 924 n.18.

2 15
2 16

Water Quality Act of 1987, 44 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).

2 17

1d.

2 18

/d.

21 9

d. Even with this heavy burden now being placed on municipalities, the Reagan
Administration thought that the burden was not heavy enough. It proposed limiting
grant construction authorizations to $6 billion with all federal ftmding for local
construction to be terminated after fiscal year 1989. Mary J. Houngton, The Clean Water
Act Arnendrncnts of 1987, BNA SPECIAL REPORTS (1987).
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"These problems, together with the fiscal difficulties now confronting most
State and local governments, [will make] it economically impossible for many
localities to accomplish effluent reductions. "220 Consequently assessing any
type of civil penalty against municipalities under these conditions is
counter-productive.
VI. How THE CRITERIA SET FORTH IN SECTION 309(d) POINTS TO No CIVIL
PENALTIES BEING ASSESSED AGAINST MUNICIPALITIES

In reviewing the criteria set forth to assess civil penalties against
municipalities for violating the CWA, 22 1 there is strong support for refusing to
assess any civil penalty for such violations. First, courts must recognize that
POTWs are not commercial or private entities operating for profit, but rather
are public facilities run by public members of the community attempting to
serve the community's needs. 222 Consequently, the decision-making may not

be as profit oriented as would be the case with a commercial or private entity.223
Second, with grant funding being virtually eliminated-the cities with the
largest problems-those that have the lowest per capita incomes-would be
adversely affected by a civil penalty.224 Fortunately, many courts have

recognized the burden that would be placed on the taxpayer if a municipality
was hit with a civil penalty. Some courts' have simply refused to assess any
penalty. As the Profittv. Lower Bucks County Joint MunicipalAuthority225 decision
noted:
Because the defendant in this action is a municipal authority, any
penalty imposed by this court would fall squarely on the taxpayers in
the Authority's geographic region comprised of the blue collar town
of Levittown, populated by persons with lower than average incomes
and also characterized by a higher than average unemployment rate.
Although it remains a distinct possibility, the imposition of a civil
penalty should be carefully scrutinized
because of its impact on the
2 26
Authority's service areas residents.
Even in cases where there is not a real economic impact on the city, courts
have still decided, in some instances, to carefully assess setting civil penalties
for the same reasons as outlined in Lower Bucks CountyJoint MunicipalAuthority.
Specifically, some courts have recognized the catastrophic effect such penalties
22 0

State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 924 (4th Cir. 1977).
22133 U.S.C. § 1319(d)(1988).
222

Proffitt v. Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth., No. CIV.A. 86-7220, 1988 WL
48552 at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 12, 1988).
223

1d.

22 4

Id.
1d.

22 5

2261d.
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would have on the taxpayers. For example, in the case of United States v. City
of San Diego,227 the court held:
[t]he city is not pleading poverty and has not stated that it is unable to
pay the amount requested by plaintiffs. However, insofar as plaintiffs'
request would represent a transfer of wealth from the residents of San
Diego to the federal treasury, the court is concerned that the only
victims in this case will be those residents. In addition, regardless of
the penalties imposed, the proposed consent decree, if accepted, will
the City and those burdens will
create significant financial burdens for
228
citizenry.
the
to
on
passed
be
surely
The civil penalty does nothing more than take money away from
municipalities, which in many instances is already scarce, and lines the pockets
of the U.S. Treasury. The United States has cut its funding for municipal sewage
treatment facilities while at the same time it seeks inordinate civil penalties for
violating the CWA. In essence, the United States is serving as a mirror image
of Robin Hood by robbing the poor to feed the rich. It is inconceivable that such
an action conforms with the goal or the intent of the Clean Water Act, to reduce
effluent limitations.
Finally, one point should be made about the so-called economic benefit that
municipalities have received as a result of their non-compliance. For example,
in City of San Diego, the court found that "the City has saved in excess of $300
million dollars over approximately the last thirty years by failing to invest in
capital improvements. Residents living here in those years earned 'dividends'
in the form of lower sewer rates."229 However, if a careful analysis is conducted
on most municipal projects, it will probably show that waiting to correct the
problem is going to cost the municipalities much more in today's dollars than
the money saved. 230 Thus, the economic benefit argument also has little or no
merit when determining whether to assess civil penalties against
municipalities.
There is one argument that has been made by both citizen groups and the
United States that has some validity regarding municipal liability under the
CWA. POTWs must be brought into compliance with the CWA. However, one
does not use a hammer to kill a fly on a glass window, for the hammer's use
probably causes far more damage than the fly itself. The same is true with
instituting civil penalties against municipalities. There are simply other less
confrontational ways of bringing municipalities into compliance.

227

No. CIV. 88-1101-B(IEG), 1991 WL 163747 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1991).

228
d. at *5, see also United States v. Winchester Mun. Utils., 944 F.2d 301,306 (6th Cir.
1991); State Water Control Bd. v. Train, 559 F.2d 921, 927 (4th Cir. 1977); United States
v. City of Providence, 492 F. Supp. 602,610 (D.R.I. 1980); New York v. Town of Wallkhill,
572 N.Y.S.2d 758, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991).
2291991 WL 163747 at *4.
230

See Lower Bucks County Joint Mun. Auth., at *6.
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Instead of seeking civil penalties, courts could provide injunctive relief
which would include a strict compliance schedule. Part of the compliance
schedule could include how the upgrading of the POTW is to be funded. The
court could also order periodic status conferences to insure that the compliance
schedule and the funding needs have been met. If the municipality and the
federal government or citizen plaintiffs are unable to agree on the compliance
schedule or the funding mechanism necessary to upgrade the POTW, then the
court can order the parties to submit a proposed plan along with memorandum
and points of authority supporting each side's argument. The court may then
decide to choose one plan over the other, to support a combination of both, or
to create a plan of its own.
If the municipality fails to meet the allotted timeframes, or the municipality
is unable to secure funding with the allotted timeframe, then the court could
order some type of sanction. The sanction, however, should not be a civil
penalty. Instead, the court should consider appointing a receiver or trustee that
will ensure that the municipality will take the appropriate steps to upgrade or
retrofit the POTW. 23 1 By appointing a receiver, the court, not the municipality,
has control over the POTW. Moreover, the court gains control without
depriving the municipality of any of the funding necessary to correct the
problem. Such funds might not be available to the municipality which has been
hit with a civil penalty. It should be noted that if it is determined that a civil
penalty is mandatory, then the penalty should be small enough and quite
possibly suspended so as not to take funding away from the POTW.
VII. CONCLUSION
To provide funding for bringing municipal POTWs into compliance with the
Clean Water Act, exposure to civil penalties for violating the Act increases. This
leaves both municipalities and the federal government in a quandary as to how
to solve the problem of POTW non-compliance. Based upon the statistics noted
earlier,232 it appears that the problem faced by municipal POTWs is far greater
than the Act, when passed, ever contemplated. Moreover, by concentrating on
the aspect of civil penalties, rather than fixing the so called problem, litigation
in many cases has lasted much longer than necessary. By eliminating the fight
over civil penalties, litigation time is reduced dramatically, since the only fight
would be over how the POTW would be brought into compliance and the
funding mechanism used to achieve compliance. In requiring both parties to
submit a plan and the court's choosing the best plan possible, litigation is
reduced even further. The effect of all of this is that what little money the
municipality has would be put towards the POT, not to lawyers or to line the
231
For example, in United States v. City of Detroit, 476 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Mich. 1979),
the court appointed the Mayor of Detroit as the Administrator of the waste-water
system. "[The court] empower[ed] and instruct[ed] him to obtain immediately the
full-time services of an executive assistant, responsible only to him, to carry out this
mandate." Id. at 520.
232
See supra text and accompanying notes 124-26.
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715

pocket of the U.S. Treasury. This appears to be the ultimate goal behind the
Clean Water Act.
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